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matter, such assumptions are not to be regarded with the utmost seriousness. The empirical demonstration of what is or is not given in experience is notoriously difficult. It may even be impossible. Perhaps the very distinction between the given and the inferred or constructed is not altogether valid. What appears as fact and what appears as fiction in our theories, depends upon what is originally assumed as datum. In the above discussion, the sensations were taken over from Berkeley as the primary data of our construction; and, for my part, I do not know that any other choice of a starting-point would have been better. What we may hope to be of real significance in such arguments is the interrelation of concepts that is developed, an interrelation which may reappear, with altered perspective and with necessary modifications of detail, in more adequate constructions. There is no claim to be made for the precise order of the development.

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CONCERNING THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY

THE following paragraphs offer the suggestion that philosophy is simply science itself as distinguished from the sciences; and this suggestion is made with reference to the objection so regularly brought against "self-psychology," that the latter is a philosophical inquiry instead of a scientific one. In other words, I suggest that all scientific inquiry, when it proceeds carefully enough and examines its beginnings, necessarily turns into philosophy. This statement hardly differs from that of one of the accepted views of philosophy, *i. e.*, that philosophy examines the presuppositions and the implications of the particular sciences with a view to harmonizing them in a comprehensive whole of knowledge. My idea is, however, rather the obverse of this view; at least I begin differently. My point is that philosophy is identical with science itself, and that the more definite and accurate and rigorous one attempts to be in studying science, the more surely will one be studying not only philosophically, but philosophy itself. The very naming of science as such indicates a belief in a single world of facts falling under a single set of laws. How there could possibly be anything in the realm of thought beyond science as thus defined, I can not conceive.

The sort of thing, for example, that is suggested as beyond science is the Kantian doctrine of the transcendental ego. But how does Kant discover this ego? How does he discover any unity, transcendental or empirical? Obviously, it seems to me, by thinking. And to think is to turn one's attention to facts and to attempt to organize and arrange those facts so that they may be conceivable

together. Kant appears to find his way back out of phenomena to what must underlie phenomena—to categories. But what are these, so far as they *are* at all, but the facts of Kant's own mind as discovered by that mind? Try as he may, Kant can be more than empirical only in that he turns from more easily observed and more obvious phenomena to the very complex phenomena of his own organizing intelligence. In other words, he definitely follows the method of science; he observes and experiments with "inner" or even "transcendental" facts. And if Kant's Transcendental Unity *is* at all, then it is part of science, empirically discovered.

The differentiae of science and philosophy are not of the sort that most idealists appear to acknowledge. Philosophy, if it is more or other than science (not than the particular sciences), is purely fanciful and unscientific, precisely what it always objects to being called. But there are vast fields—so we may suppose, at least—that the particular sciences have not yet appropriated. And when we are most rigidly and fundamentally scientific, we are constantly forced into these fields—or rather into this undivided and unlimited area—into science itself. And *then* we are rightly said to be thinking philosophically.

So it is that psychology is true to itself, or at least true to science (as distinct from an already defined and delimited *psychological* science) when it objects to being defined in any way which leaves out the central fact upon which it is based, namely, the consciousness of self, without which psychology surely would disappear along with—well, the universe, I should suppose. But at the same time such inquiries as keep insisting upon this basic fact may well be the beginnings of a particular new science or of various new sciences, allied, perhaps, to current psychology of the orthodox structural, or functional, or behavioristic schools. It may well be the case, on the contrary, that this connection with what is conventionally known as psychology is more remote than has so far appeared. But, at least, I should say that when self-psychology is objected to as philosophical, the real significance of the objection is rather different from the apparently condemnatory meaning of the objector.

If self-psychology is philosophical, it is because it is trying to be truly and fully scientific. The endeavor of any thinker, however, to be *purely scientific* is destined to certain failure, for what is most fundamentally scientific is *science* instead of a part of any one particular science; or if it is dwelt on long enough and is the right sort of material, namely, that which the thinker in question is able to organize, it becomes not just science, but one particular science with its own particular limited field. In other words, the attempt to be thoroughly scientific may well lead to a new special science; but

until this special science becomes defined, all speculation in the general field of thought out of which it emerges is that most fertile of all the parts of thought, *i. e.*, philosophy itself.

Philosophy is thus the concrete embodiment of science in general. *Science*, as a general term applicable to all the sciences, denotes just these various sciences; but it connotes scientific method in the very sense in which all philosophy aspires to be scientific. Historically, it would even be more appropriate to say that the modern connotation of the term *science* is expressed in the ancient term *philosophy*. Thus when modern scientists engage in science in general, or study what they call the foundations or the grammar of science, they are doing what has for centuries been called philosophizing; and whether they like it or not, they are what is regularly and traditionally called philosophers. *Science*, as a general term, has precisely that indefinitely great extension that reduces its intension to the vanishing point; and the failure of the scientist to arrive at abstract science itself is inevitable. But we are not willing to call the most fundamental and important part of our thinking a failure, and we name it philosophy. The ancient philosophers were many of them avowed scientists. Modern scientists, as they increase in breadth of view and power of thought, tend to become philosophers. And it seems to me not unreasonable to see in philosophy a name for science itself; an abstraction, to be sure, but an abstraction which the most concrete scientific facts force us into. While we remain so situated, we rightly maintain our self-respect by embodying the abstract with a name—we become philosophers.

To use a figure, we become the votaries of a god, the seekers after a divine essence, knowledge itself—an essence which never materializes except in such concrete forms as reveal, one at a time, and in endless succession, its numberless and inexhaustible aspects, but never its central self. Genuine worship of any of these aspects (any sort of scientific research) gives the worshiper an intimation of the central and original essence; but worship of the sheer essence, while it may lead inwardly to meditation or even philosophic rapture, is outwardly successful only when it discovers a new incarnation of the divinity. And such outward success is philosophical failure, for the philosopher demands the very essence itself, and all incarnations are but partial.

Perhaps the figure weakens the point. But it seems to me to define my conception of philosophy and to identify it with science in general. And while, in the nature of the case, I can not identify the central fact of self with the “divine essence” of knowledge, it seems to me not *mere* speculation to say that the self of self-psychology, instead of giving us access to a field of *unscientific* philo-

sophical speculation, rather points us to the very source of all science, which is indeed what is called philosophy, but which is no less scientific than laboratory work in electrical measurements or color perception.

On the basis of such a conception of the continuity, if not the identity, of science and philosophy I can at once hiss the transcendentalists, applaud the scientists, and yet be myself a philosopher, regarding philosophy and the philosophical method as the most valuable either of mental achievements or of intellectual occupations, and the most purely scientific. And in thus saving my own intellectual integrity I seem to myself to offer to scientists and philosophers a ground of agreement and a basis for mutual respect, without at all giving up their traditions or their convictions. Such agreement is much to be desired, for their present state of independence results in such ridiculous misunderstanding and such disrespect for each other that it is a danger to their own thinking. To despise the empirical as beneath you is like despising the earth itself, the source of life; but to despise the "philosophical" is only another way of despising that same earth; for any science is fundamentally scientific only when it is philosophical; philosophy is, after all, its only source of meaning.

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SOCIETIES

NEW YORK BRANCH OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION

THE New York Branch of the American Psychological Association met in conjunction with the Section of Anthropology and Psychology of the New York Academy of Sciences at Columbia University on November 26. The following papers were read:

Psychological Examinations of College Freshmen.—Miss EDITH CAROTHERS.

The purpose of the investigation is first, to establish norms and standards of performance in mental tests for Barnard freshmen, and second, to furnish information of aid to college authorities in solving problems of administration, and of aid to students in giving them a knowledge of their abilities and aptitudes. A series of twenty-one psychological tests was selected and tried out on a group of 100 Barnard freshmen during the year 1915-16. The tests used were: Coordination, Tapping, Cancellations, Number Checking, Color Naming, Directions, Opposites, Verb Object, Mixed Relations, Word